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Abstract: Procyclical government spending occurs when government expenditures increase at a 
faster rate than income in an economic upturn but fall at a faster rate in a recession. Voracity effects 
occur when competition for increased spending proves more effective as national income increases. 
Public choice theory can be applied to describe the distribution of fiscal power across different tiers of 
government to shed insight into competition for intergovernmental transfers. Politicians have electoral 
incentives to press for intergovernmental transfers but they also have electoral incentives to signal 
their ability to manage the economy. With this mix of incentives, the prediction is that 
intergovernmental transfers will be procyclical and that sub-central government spending will be 
more procyclical than central government spending. Public choice analysis of pressure for increased 
public spending predicts a specific pattern of cyclical government spending. This pattern can be 
observed when analysing government expenditures in 20 OECD countries between 1995 and 2006. 
 
 
Keywords Business Cycles; Fiscal Policy; Voracity Effects; Volatility. 
JEL classification E62; H50; H60; H70 
____________ 
A. Abbott 
Business School, University of Hull, Cottingham Road, Hull, HU6 7RX, UK 
email: a.abbott@hull.ac.uk 
 
* P. Jones  
Department of Economics, University of Bath, Claverton Down, Bath, BA2 7AY, UK 
email: p.r.jones@bath.ac.uk; Tel: +44 1225 385828; Fax: +44 1225 383423. 
1 
 
1. Introduction 
 The cyclicality of government spending measures the way government spending responds to 
changes in the output gap. While many commentators (e.g., Alesina et al. 2008) suggest that 
economists anticipate countercyclicality (i.e. an increase in spending when output falls below 
potential output), there is evidence of procyclical government spending. Procyclical government 
expenditure was first reported in Latin America (Gavin et al. 1996) but now there is evidence of 
procyclical spending in developing countries (e.g., Kaminsky et al. 2004; Talvi and Végh 2005; Woo 
2009) and in OECD countries (e.g., Arreaza et al. 1998; Hercowitz and Strawszynski 2004; Lane 
2003).  
 The literature on procyclicality has also focused on the different budgetary items that comprise 
overall government spending. Lane (2003) reports procyclical spending from capital accounts and 
procyclical spending on public sector wages in the OECD. Lamo et al. (2007) focus on procyclicality 
in government consumption (and its main components) in the Euro Area. Darby and Melitz (2008) 
consider cyclicality in budgets that focus on expenditure (e.g., health) and budgets that focus on 
redistribution (e.g., incapacity payments; sick pay). Abbott and Jones (2011) find evidence of 
procyclicality in some functional categories of spending in the OECD (e.g., health, education). Other 
studies focus on the question of whether expenditures are procyclical if estimates are based on 
real-time data (i.e. the data that governments rely on when they make decisions), rather than on data 
that subsequently has been revised (e.g., Cimadomo 2008).  
 It is not the case that all studies always report procyclical spending (e.g., Fiorito 1997; Forni 
and Momigliano 2004; Darby and Meltiz 2008) but there are reasons to expect that procyclical 
spending is  more likely in some government budgets than in others (Lane 2003). There are specific 
reasons for anticipating procyclical sub-central government spending. Revenue streams of sub-central 
government typically are narrower than central government revenues and sub-central governments 
have more limited capacity to borrow through credit markets (Arena and Revilla 2009). Sub-central 
governments are sensitive to the receipt of intergovernmental transfers and to pressures to respond to 
intergovernmental transfers. Lane (2003) argues that greater consideration should be paid to the 
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possibility that ‘provincial or state government’ spending is procyclical and the first objective is to 
test for procyclicality in sub-central government spending in the OECD. 
 One explanation for procyclical government spending is that voracity effects exert an influence 
(Lane and Tornell 1996; Tornell and Lane 1998). When national income increases, political pressure 
for government spending increases and prudence is relaxed. Voracity effects are more likely if 
government institutions are weak and if there are significant differences between the preferences of 
different groups in the economy, e.g., between the preferences of producer groups, consumer groups 
and ethnic groups (Akitoby et al. 2006).  
Lane (2003:2665) argues that “....it is plausible that variation in procyclicality across different 
expenditure items will be influenced by the .... distribution of fiscal power....”. The second objective 
of this paper is to test the proposition that the ‘distribution of fiscal power’ increases the likelihood 
that sub-central government spending will be procyclical. The proposition is that public choice 
analysis of ‘the distribution of fiscal power’ sheds insight when predicting patterns of procyclical 
spending. Lane (2003:2665) refers to the impact of “....other political claimants such as state or 
provincial governments within a federal system” and the objective is to consider the implications of 
this impact for patterns of procyclical spending. The intention is to address two questions. Are 
sub-central government expenditures procyclical? Will public choice theory prove helpful when 
predicting patterns of procyclical spending across different tiers of government? 
 Predictions formed with reference to a public choice analysis of the distribution of fiscal power 
are tested. The model used to test predictions encapsulates changes in the ratio of government 
spending to GDP in a group of 20 OECD economies between 1995 and 2006. The dependent 
variables (e.g., sub-central government expenditures and central government expenditures) are 
regressed on current and lagged values of changes in the output gap and on changes in control 
variables. 
 The following section of the paper applies public choice theory to form testable predictions. 
Section 3 presents the regression model and the data used to test predictions. Section 4 reports the 
estimation results. Concluding remarks are presented in section 5. 
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2. The Distribution of Political Influence 
If the prevailing expectation is that governments act countercyclically, why might they choose 
to spend procyclically? Benevolent governments might choose to spend procyclically but the 
circumstances in which procyclical spending is welfare-maximizing are very specific and, with 
evidence that voracity effects are relevant, there is usually more than a gentle hint that procyclicality 
reflects government failure. 
Keynesians anticipate that governments will spend countercyclically (to stabilise the economy) 
but neoclassical economists demonstrate that there are circumstances in which procyclical spending 
can be justified. If markets are working perfectly, the welfare-maximizing direction of a change of 
government spending in a neoclassical model depends on the degree of substitutability between 
government consumption and private consumption. If they are substitutes, government expenditures 
should be countercyclical. If they are complements, a benign government would increase spending in 
a procyclical fashion (Lane 2003).  
Procyclicality can also be welfare-maximizing if there is market failure. Focusing on 
developing countries, Alesina et al. (2008) suggest that procyclicality occurs because there are 
imperfections in financial markets. They note that “....in bad times, many developing countries cannot 
borrow, or can do so only at very high interest rates, therefore they cannot run deficits and have to cut 
spending; in booms, they can borrow more easily and choose to do so, increasing public spending....” 
(p. 1007). 
Notwithstanding these scenarios, it is difficult to dismiss the importance of voracity effects. 
Lane (2003) analyzed the impact of voracity effects on procyclical spending in OECD countries. He 
used Henisz’s (2000) index as a proxy for ‘voracity effects’.1 The index was not relevant for all 
components of government expenditure, but it was statistically significant when explaining 
procyclical government consumption and government wage expenditure. He suggested that voracity 
effects might also be relevant if analysis focused on provincial government expenditures. This paper 
                                                          
1 Henisz’s (2000) index is based on the number of veto points in the process of decision-making and the 
distribution of differences in preferences for government spending. The first step in compiling the index is to 
count the number of veto points over policies in branches of government. Voracity effects are likely to be less 
relevant as this number increases. The index also considers differences in group preferences but voracity effects 
are likely to more relevant as these increase. 
4 
 
sets out to consider the impact of the ‘distribution of fiscal power’ across different tiers of 
government.  
The first objective is to apply public choice theory. Public choice scholars analyze the political 
process as a ‘political market’ (e.g., Buchanan 1972) in which politicians have an incentive to supply 
policies to win votes from consumer-voters (see Peacock’s 1992 review of this approach). One way to 
win a majority of votes is to increase public spending by ensuring that the tax costs are borne by a 
small minority of voters (e.g., the very rich) but whether taxes are borne by a minority of voters or by 
voters generally, politicians also have an electoral incentive to rely on taxes that appear innocuous. A 
well-established literature (based on Puviani 1903) indicates that there is ‘fiscal illusion’. Empirical 
studies indicate that voters under-estimate taxation and that they under-estimate some taxes more than 
others (Dollery and Worthington 1996 and Oates 1988 review this literature).  
When collective decision-making depends on a simple majority-voting rule (50%+1), 
politicians can win the support of specific groups by dissipating the tax costs of expenditure programs 
across the whole community (Tullock 1959). They can win votes if they provide spending programs 
that appear to be paid for by other taxpayers. In the Calculus of Consent Buchanan and Tullock 
(1962) focus on the electoral advantage that middle-income voters enjoy because, with their support, 
the poor are able to press for policies that transfer resources to themselves. In questionnaire studies, 
the evidence is that voters approve greater spending that requires greater taxation, provided the 
increased taxation will be paid by others (e.g., Miles et al. 2003).  
Politicians are more willing to increase government spending when voters underestimate the tax 
costs (Buchanan and Wagner 1977). Local politicians are willing to increase public spending when 
they are in receipt of intergovernmental transfers because intergovernmental transfers mitigate the 
local tax cost that would otherwise be required to increase public spending. They have electoral 
incentives to press for intergovernmental transfers from a ‘common pool’ of central tax revenue 
because this appears to displace the tax costs on others and contributes to ‘fiscal illusion’. It has been 
argued that competition for intergovernmental transfers produces a ‘Leviathan’ tendency for increased 
government spending (Brennan and Buchanan 1980). How will the incentive to compete for 
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intergovernmental transfers influence the pattern of procyclical spending across different branches of 
government? 
While spending might increase if local voters believe that taxes are paid by others, why would 
this imply that sub-central government spending might be procyclical?  The explanation is based on 
two arguments. The first is that sub-central spending is more procyclical than anticipated because 
intergovernmental transfers are more procyclical than anticipated. The second is that the tendency for 
sub-central government spending to be procyclical is magnified by political pressure to spend more 
(less) than anticipated when intergovernmental transfers increase (decrease).  
 
2.1. Political Pressure for Intergovernmental Transfers  
Local politicians have incentives to compete for intergovernmental transfers that mitigate the 
need for local taxation. Mueller (2003:223) focuses on these incentives and notes that “....the more the 
government spends holding taxes constant the happier voters are.…” and “.…the higher the 
probability of incumbent politicians being re-elected….”. The implication is that the more countries 
rely on a tiered structure of government, the smaller each jurisdiction will be and the greater voters in 
local jurisdictions are likely to feel that intergovernmental transfers are paid for by other taxpayers in 
the country.  
With incentives to win votes, politicians in local jurisdictions press voraciously for 
intergovernmental transfers when national income increases. When national income increases they are 
‘leaning against an open door’ (because central government tax revenue is increasing). When national 
income is decreasing, central government is more prudent (because central government tax revenues 
may fall). The exuberance that accompanies increases in national income and the austerity that 
accompanies decreases in national income suggest that intergovernmental transfers are likely to be 
procyclical.  
The distribution of fiscal power depends on local politicians’ pressure for intergovernmental 
transfers and central government politicians’ ability to respond. The literature on fiscal federalism 
explains why central governments devolve provision of local public goods to sub-central governments 
and why they retain responsibility for managing the economy (e.g., Oates 1972). Central governments 
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are more effective in pursuing that goal than sub-central governments would be. If one local 
jurisdiction were to attempt to reduce local unemployment by raising spending it would have very 
little success, because (with open trade between jurisdictions) the local multiplier is small. If 
sub-central governments were to rely on deficit spending to manage local economies, they would be 
forced to compete with one another (e.g., by paying higher interest rates to attract loanable funds). In 
some countries, sub-central governments must operate with a de facto balanced-budget rule. 
With this assignment, politicians in central governments have electoral incentives to 
demonstrate that they can manage the economy. In empirical studies, voters indicate that they judge 
politicians with reference to politicians’ personal characteristics and that one of the most important 
personal attributes is ability to manage the economy (e.g., Jones and Hudson 1996). Voters expect 
politicians to respond when there is instability and, as Alesina et al. (2008) indicate, the expectation is 
countercyclical government spending (e.g., an increase in central government current and capital 
account expenditure when output falls below potential output). In sub-central jurisdictions, 
politicians’ electoral incentive is to press for intergovernmental transfers, but at the central 
government level, politicians’ incentive is to signal that they can manage the economy.  
The distribution of fiscal power depends on the change experienced in national income. When 
there is an increase in national income, local politicians press voraciously for intergovernmental 
transfers and central government politicians respond because tax revenues are increasing and there is 
no incentive to signal ability to manage the economy by any increase in other central government 
current and capital account expenditures. When there is a fall in national income, local politicians may 
press for intergovernmental transfers but central government politicians’ are fearful that tax revenues 
are likely to fall at the very time that they must signal their willingness to increase other central 
government current and capital account expenditures. The observation that voters are poorly informed 
about intergovernmental transfers (e.g., Oates 1979) means that central government politicians are 
under pressure to increase central government spending on government investment and consumption 
programs. 
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The implication is that ‘intergovernmental transfers’ are a ‘swing variable’.2 As the distribution 
of fiscal power is sensitive to the way in which national income changes, intergovernmental transfers 
are greater than expected when national income increases but less than expected when national 
income falls. Intergovernmental transfers are more procyclical than other central government 
expenditures. 
When national income increases, central government politicians are more willing than expected 
to increase intergovernmental transfers (because tax revenues are increasing and because there is no 
incentive to signal that they are managing the economy by increasing other central government 
current and capital expenditure). When national income falls, they are more austere (because tax 
revenues may fall and because they must now signal their ability to manage the economy by spending 
more on central government consumption and on central government investment). In some countries, 
the same politicians that represent sub-central jurisdictions are also the politicians that collectively 
signal ability to manage the economy. The same mix of incentives means that, while these politicians 
press voraciously for intergovernmental transfers when national income increases, they are more 
concerned about increasing other central government spending when national income falls.  
Intergovernmental transfers are likely to be procyclical and more procyclical than central 
government spending. The implication is that sub-central government spending is likely to be more 
procyclical than central government spending. 
 
2.2. Political Pressure to Spend Intergovernmental Transfers  
While sub-central government spending is likely to be more procyclical than central 
government expenditure, because intergovernmental transfers are procyclical, there are other public 
choice arguments suggesting that sub-central government spending will be procyclical. Sub-central 
government spending is also likely to be more procyclical because sub-central government 
expenditure increases by more (or falls by more) when there is an increase (or fall) in 
intergovernmental transfers than when there is an equal increase (or fall) in residents’ private income. 
                                                          
2 We are grateful to an anonymous referee for this terminology. 
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Hines and Thaler (1995) note that Arthur Okun dubbed this difference the ‘flypaper effect’. The 
implication is that ‘money sticks where it hits’ (if it is received via the public sector it is spent in the 
public sector). Bailey and Connolly (1998) illustrate the difference by comparing the income 
consumption path of a local jurisdiction in receipt of intergovernmental transfers with the income 
consumption path if private income increases. Both Hines and Thaler (1995) and Bailey and Connolly 
(1998) review empirical studies that show that the income elasticity of demand is larger when 
sub-central government are in receipt of intergovernmental transfers (even when intergovernmental 
transfers take the form of lump sum, non-conditional grants). 
Bailey and Connolly (1998) review public choice explanations of the ‘flypaper effect’. The 
receipt of intergovernmental grants (paid for by others in the country) gives local politicians greater 
freedom to respond to pressures to spend from: local bureaucrats (Niskanen 1971; Romer and 
Rosenthal 1980); local interest groups (Dougan and Kenyon 1988); and local voters (Oates 1979). The 
pressures are intense because receipt of the grant means that voters systematically underestimate the 
tax cost of expenditure programs (Oates 1979). 
The implication is that the impact of procyclical intergovernmental transfers on sub-central 
government spending is magnified when focusing on sub-central government spending. Sub-central 
government spending will increase (or fall) by far more than anticipated if there is an increase (or fall) 
in intergovernmental transfers.3 
A public choice analysis of the distribution of fiscal power (when politicians press for 
intergovernmental transfers and spend intergovernmental transfers) predicts a specific pattern of 
procyclicality: 
(i) intergovernmental transfers are likely to be procyclical; 
(ii) sub-central government expenditures are likely to be procyclical; 
(iii) both intergovernmental transfers and sub-central government expenditures are likely to be more 
procyclical than central government expenditures. 
                                                          
3 It is important to note that some critics do not observe ‘flypaper effects’ and that others argue that, if there is a 
‘flypaper effect’, it is not obvious that this has been caused by failings in political processes. Cullis and Jones 
(2009) review this literature. Here the argument is simply that, in the presence of a (well-documented) flypaper 
effect the tendency for procyclical sub-central government expenditure is magnified. 
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3. The Model and the Data 
 The model used to test these predictions is that presented by Darby and Melitz (2008). Changes 
in different categories of government expenditure (xi) as a percentage of national income, (xi/)t are 
explained as follows: 
     
   
* *
i 0i 1i ti ci 1i 2i t 3i Lt 4i t 5it t t 1
6i i 7i i tit 1 t 1
x t r db
x x

 
                  
      
 
(1) 
where xi is the ith type of government expenditure, consisting of either central government transfers to 
sub-central governments; capital and current central government expenditures, sub-central 
government expenditures, sub-central current and capital government expenditures; or sub-central 
government spending minus transfers. c are the country fixed effects; t are time dummies; t is a 
linear time trend;  is annual output; * is potential output; and therefore (/*) is the output gap. 
Like Darby and Melitz (2008) we add two control variables: Δπ, which is the change in a country’s 
inflation rate and rL is the long term interest rate. In addition, given that the cyclicality of spending 
could depend upon the initial fiscal position of the government sector, we add the debt-GDP ratio 
(dbt) at time period t. 
Following Darby and Melitz (2008), three stage least squares (3SLS) estimation is used to 
control for the possibility that the output gap is likely to be endogenous with respect to government 
spending. The output gap, the change in the inflation rate and the interest rate are instrumented to 
control for the possibility of reciprocal influences of the dependent variable on these series. The 
instruments include lags of the endogenous variable, oil price inflation, the lagged proportion of the 
population out of work and change in exports as a percentage of GDP. Lags of the instruments and the 
time dummies, together with country fixed effects, are included in the instrumented equations. We 
also test for the robustness of our 3SLS results by re-estimating the equation via a SYS-GMM 
dynamic panel estimator. 
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 When interpreting the coefficients of equation (1), 1 estimates the percentage rise in spending 
arising from a percentage change in the output gap and 4 estimates the size of the lagged response in 
spending. Δ(/*)t-1 is included because spending decisions may take time to respond to changes in 
the output gap (for example, if there are administrative and implementation lags or lagged responses 
to voracity effects). Lagged levels and lagged differences of the dependent variable are also included 
because current changes in spending may be responding to lagged responses of the dependent 
variable, as reflected in 5 and 6. The time trend and lagged level of xi/ are included to control for 
persistence.  
 Data on spending by local, state and central tiers of government (including total spending, 
current spending, and expenditure on capital projects) are available from the IMF’s Government 
Finance statistics database. This source is important because it also provides data on central 
government transfers to sub-national governments. It was necessary to aggregate data for local and 
state governments to produce a series for sub-national governments because, for some countries, data 
are available only for either local government or state government (not for both). 
National income data, output gap figures, and the debt-GDP ratio were taken from the OECD 
Economic Outlook database. There are advantages if real-time data for the output gap are used rather 
than final data for the output gap (which is sometimes subject to significant revision). If reference is 
made to real-time data it is possible to model contemporary discretionary fiscal policy responses to 
the output gap within the same calendar year. The real-time change in the output gap (Δ/*) is 
defined as the predicted value of /* early in a year for the same year minus the concurrent 
prediction of /* for the preceding year (Darby and Melitz 2008; Cimadomo 2008). In both 
instances, the values are those recorded in the December issues of the OECD Economic Outlook. The 
series for both the inflation rate and the long-term interest rate are also taken from the OECD 
Economic Outlook database. The sample consists of data for 20 high-income countries over the period 
1995-2006.4 The choice of this sample was restricted by the availability of the intergovernmental 
                                                          
4 The countries are Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, 
Italy, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom and the 
United States. 
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transfer series. While this is available for most of the high-income OECD countries (excluding 
notably Australia and Japan), it is published consistently only from 1995 onwards.5 All series remain 
in national currencies and are quoted in nominal terms, assuming an identical deflator for both 
government spending and the output gap. 
 
4. The Empirical Results 
 Table 1 reports results from the 3SLS estimation of equation (1). In this study, the first 
considerations are the estimates of 1 and 5, which measure the current and lagged response of 
spending to changes in the real-time output gap.  
[Insert Table 1 near here] 
In only one of the eight categories of spending, sub-central spending minus transfers, is there 
evidence of countercyclical spending. This is for the estimated coefficient with reference to the 
contemporaneous real-time output gap (and the magnitude is -0.613). But when attention focuses on 
the lagged real-time output gap, there is evidence of procyclicality for total sub-central current 
spending; sub-central current spending; and intergovernmental transfers. Moreover, there is evidence 
of a lagged voracity effect with respect to capital spending in the central government sector. With 
reference to the predicted pattern of cyclicality: 
 
(i) Intergovernmental transfers are procyclical. The estimated coefficient for Δ(/*)t-1 in the 
intergovernmental transfers column is positive and statistically significant. The estimated coefficient 
is 0.218. 
 
(ii) Sub-central government expenditures are procyclical. The coefficient for Δ(/*)t-1 is positive 
and statistically significant with a coefficient of 0.361. The estimate for sub-central government 
spending implies that a one percentage increase in the lagged output gap raises sub-central 
government spending by 36.1% of one percentage point. The results also indicate that this 
                                                          
5 For a few countries (e.g., Greece; Iceland) data are published only for a more limited interval. 
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procyclicality is driven by the potential votes that are possible if current government spending can be 
increased; the coefficient for procyclical sub-central current government expenditure (0.352) is also 
statistically significant. 
 
(iii) Intergovernmental transfers and sub-central government expenditures are more procyclical 
than central government expenditures. The equivalent coefficient for central government spending is 
-0.082 but this is not statistically significant. It may be that politicians are more likely to focus on 
countercyclical spending to demonstrate their ability to manage the economy, but they are also 
sensitive to the possible vote losses that may be incurred if they cut central spending (even when 
national income increases). Hence the acyclical outcome. There is no evidence of procyclicality for 
any of the constituent parts of central government spending (with reference to the contemporary 
output gap or the lagged output gap); the estimates for current spending and capital spending are 
statistically insignificant. Fiorito and Kollintzas (1994) and Talvi and Végh (2005) also report a 
statistically insignificant slope estimate for general government expenditure for the G7 (in their case 
the estimate related to the sum of both central and sub-central spending). 6 
These results are persuasive because so many estimates in Table 1 are consistent with the 
predicted pattern of cyclicality. However, it is always the case that a set of estimates that support one 
explanation might also support another (untested) explanation. In Table 1, estimates of procyclicality 
are based on the lagged output gap and it has been argued that estimates of procyclicality might be 
influenced by administrative and implementation lags (e.g., see Cimadomo 2008). With the possibility 
that there might be a configuration of lags that also explains this pattern of results, is it really the case 
that the test indicates the relevance of voracity effects? 
Further support for our conclusions comes from the re-estimation of (1) using the SYS-GMM 
estimator, the results from which are reported in Table 2. The estimated coefficients are broadly 
consistent in both sign and magnitude with those reported in Table 1. Procyclicality from Δ(/*)t-1 is 
again reported for total sub-central spending, sub-central current spending, and intergovernmental 
                                                          
6 Woo (2009) also reports a mean fiscal cyclicality coefficient of 0.176 for the OECD countries, in contrast to a 
mean coefficient of 0.818 for a sample of developing countries. 
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transfers, while these new estimates also suggest procyclicality from the contemporaneous and lagged 
values of Δ(/*) for the current spending of central government and contemporaneous 
counter-cyclicality for total sub-central government spending. 
[Insert Table 2 near here] 
While the estimates in Tables 1 and 2 are consistent with the predicted pattern of procyclicality, 
it is possible to pursue another test to consider whether procyclicality is sensitive to the extent to 
which countries rely on decentralization. Lane (2003) tested the impact of voracity effects by using 
Henisz’s index as a proxy for voracity effects. Critics question the use of this index (Williams and 
Siddique 2008) and it is far too general to test the influence exerted by local politicians. The best 
available indicator of their voracity effect (in the pursuit of intergovernmental grants) is the degree to 
which a country is decentralized. The best indicator of decentralization is the ratio of central 
government spending to total government spending (see Hindricks and Myles 2006; Panizza 1999). 
While this proxy is broader than might be ideal, it is the best available indicator (when focusing on 
this ‘common pool’ problem). If it is reasonable to anticipate that voracity effects might increase as 
the level of decentralization increases, it is far from obvious that administrative and implementation 
lags will increase as the level of decentralization increases (if there are administrative economies of 
scale, both of these lags are likely to fall as decentralisation increases).  
Turning to this cross-country test, the proposition is that: 
5ij j j
ˆ Z         ( 2 ) 
where 5 jˆ  are the estimated cyclicality coefficients from a 3SLS regression that includes all the 
variables in (1) plus a set of country-specific level dummies and country-specific multiplicative 
dummies that interact with Δ(/*)t-1. We thus derive 20 separate estimates for β5i, using the 
coefficient for Δ(/*)t-1 and the coefficients of the multiplicative dummies. Zj is a set of control 
variables that includes: the volatility of output, GDP per capita, trade openness, and the ratio of 
central government spending to total government spending. 
The control variables include the best available indicator of local politicians’ voracious 
appetites for intergovernmental grants and variables that proved important in other studies (e.g., Lane 
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2003). As argued in section 2 of the paper, the more countries rely on a tiered structure of 
government, the smaller each local jurisdiction will be and the greater the competition for 
intergovernmental grants (because it appears that the extent to which intergovernmental grants 
mitigate taxation is even greater). The more countries rely on a tiered structure of government, the 
more voraciously local politicians press for intergovernmental transfers. 
Table 3 presents the results from three sets of regressions. The OLS and Weighted Least 
Squares regressions assume that decentralization (the proportion of central government spending) is 
exogenous at any moment of time.7 The second instruments for the determinants of this measure of 
fiscal centralization that were reported by Panizza (1999), i.e., for: GDP per capita, land area of the 
country and population.8 The estimates are provided for those components of spending where there is 
evidence of procyclicality in Table 1 (i.e., total sub-central government spending, current sub-central 
government spending and intergovernmental transfers). The estimates are broadly similar across the 
various specifications. They suggest an inverse relationship between cyclicality and the central 
government spending proportion. 
[Insert Table 3 near here] 
While empirical results are never definitive, the consistency between the results of both of these 
tests is relevant when assessing the impact of local politicians’ voracious appetite for 
intergovernmental grants. 
 
5. Conclusions 
 This paper set out to assess the role that public choice theory might play when explaining 
procyclical government expenditure. While procyclical expenditure might increase welfare, the 
circumstances in which this is likely are specific and studies emphasize the impact created by voracity 
effects. Following Lane’s (2003) suggestion, this paper focuses on the distribution of fiscal power 
                                                          
7 We adopt the Weighted Least Squares estimator since the dependent variables are estimated variables, which 
could lead to potential problems of heteroscedasticity. 
8 These series are taken from the World Bank, World Development Indicators, as are the other control variables 
used for equation (2). We exclude ethnic fractionalization and democracy, previously suggested by Panizza 
(1999), since they are likely to be weak instruments for a group of OECD economies. 
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across different tiers of government. It reports evidence of procyclical expenditure in OECD 
countries, evidence that is consistent with predictions premised on public choice analysis. 
 The first conclusion is that there is evidence of procyclical spending by sub-central 
governments in 20 OECD countries between 1995 and 2006. With Darby and Melitz’s (2008) model 
it is possible to test for procyclicality. Estimates of procyclical intergovernmental transfers and 
procyclical sub-central government expenditures are reported with reference to the output gap 
measured in real-time. They are reported with reference to the output gap lagged one period (to allow 
for the administration and implementation of spending decisions). Central governments’ expenditures 
are acyclical when estimated with reference to contemporary and lagged values of the output gap, but 
there is a distinct pattern of procyclical sub-central government expenditures. 
 The second conclusion is that the application of public choice theory makes it possible to 
introduce a new test for the relevance of voracity effects. This test is whether the pattern of cyclicality 
matches the pattern predicted by public choice theory. In this paper, the pattern of cyclicality across 
different tiers of government in a typical OECD country resonates with predictions premised on 
public choice analysis. There was also support for the proposition that voracity effects are relevant 
when testing the sensitivity of procyclical spending to changes in voracity effects across OECD 
countries (as in Lane 2003).  
 Both tests suggest that public choice theory offers insight. As well as providing testable 
predictions: 
i)  public choice theory explains why voracity effects produce procyclical spending. It is not simply 
the case that competition for intergovernmental transfers ratchets up sub-central government 
spending. The mix of electoral incentives (e.g., to win intergovernmental grants and to demonstrate 
ability to manage the economy) means that intergovernmental transfers are greater than anticipated 
when national income increases but less than anticipated when national income falls. The ‘distribution 
of fiscal power’ implies that procyclical intergovernmental transfers increase the tendency for 
subcentral government expenditures to be procyclical and this tendency (for procyclicality) is 
magnified when public choice explanations of the flypaper effect are relevant. 
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ii)  public choice theory informs analysis of the normative implications of procyclical spending. If 
voracity effects (competition for public spending) motivate governments, voracity effects may be a 
desirable modus operandi if procyclical expenditures increase welfare. On the other hand, if they 
reflect distortions in political processes (e.g., the ‘common pool’ problem and ‘fiscal illusion’) it is 
impossible to remain sanguine. This is particularly relevant when considering sub-central government 
expenditure in the OECD because sub-central government expenditures are growing as a proportion 
of overall state activity in the OECD (Bergvall et al. 2006).  
 To our knowledge, this is the first application of public choice theory to analyze procyclical 
expenditure by different tiers of government. The conclusions suggest that the theory is capable of 
offering insight into the impact that the distribution of fiscal power across all branches of government 
exerts on the pattern of cyclicality across all categories of expenditures (e.g., current and capital 
expenditures on defence, education, social security and other budgetary line items). 
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Table 1: 3SLS Estimates 
 
          
 Sub-central government  Central government 
 
          
 Total 
Spending 
Current 
Spending 
Capital 
Spending 
Transfers Total Spending 
minus transfers 
 
 Total 
Spending 
Current 
Spending 
Capital 
Spending 
α0i -2.705 
(-0.62) 
-3.092 
(-0.85) 
0.121 
(0.19) 
-2.959 
(-0.90) 
0.727 
(0.25) 
 13.777* 
(3.21) 
25.704* 
(2.10) 
0.606 
(0.68) 
t 0.995* 
(2.39) 
0.903* 
(2.69) 
0.071 
(0.83) 
0.623 
(1.84) 
0.238 
(0.86) 
 -0.582 
(-1.32) 
-0.730 
(-0.56) 
0.075 
(0.78) 
 *
t
    -0.653 
(-1.85) 
-0.541* 
(-2.12) 
-0.093 
(-0.93) 
-0.024 
(-0.08) 
-0.613* 
(-2.81) 
 0.338 
(0.95) 
0.884 
(0.87) 
-0.108 
(-1.16) 
t  0.336 
(0.30) 
-0.022 
(-0.24) 
0.011 
(0.64) 
0.104 
(1.21) 
-0.098 
(-1.36) 
 0.004 
(0.03) 
-0.017 
(-0.04) 
-0.047 
(-1.82) 
rLt -0.835 
(-1.75) 
-0.780* 
(-2.14) 
0.016 
(0.14) 
-0.398 
(-1.04) 
-0.211 
(-0.68) 
 0.859 
(1.67) 
-1.428 
(-0.90) 
-0.283* 
(-1.99) 
dbt -0.009 
(-0.58) 
0.0005 
(0.04) 
-0.009* 
(-2.29) 
0.001 
(0.08) 
-0.002 
(-0.20) 
 0.044 
(1.88) 
0.089 
(1.24) 
-0.002 
(-0.45) 
 *
t 1
    0.361
* 
(3.75) 
0.304* 
(4.02) 
0.003 
(0.17) 
0.218* 
(2.69) 
0.070 
(1.06) 
 -0.093 
(-0.92) 
0.385 
(1.37) 
0.049* 
(2.03) 
 
t 1
x

  -0.290
* 
(-3.35) 
-0.265* 
(-3.34) 
-0.497* 
(-3.52) 
-0.482* 
(-3.70) 
-0.225* 
(-3.97) 
 -0.447* 
(-4.61) 
-0.629* 
(-2.19) 
-1.269* 
(-5.12) 
 
t 1
x

   0.122 
(0.98) 
0.125 
(1.15) 
0.040 
(0.24) 
0.265* 
(2.21) 
-0.136 
(-1.41) 
 0.212* 
(2.31) 
0.038 
(0.14) 
0.049 
(0.27) 
          
Note: 3SLS estimates of the cyclicality equation derived instrumenting for the output gap, inflation and interest rate. The equation includes country fixed effects and time dummies not reported to conserve space. * 
indicates significance at the 5% level. 
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Table 2: SYS-GMM Estimates 
 
          
 Sub-central government  Central government 
 
          
 Total 
Spending 
Current 
Spending 
Capital 
Spending 
Transfers Total Spending 
minus transfers 
 
 Total 
Spending 
Current 
Spending 
Capital 
Spending 
α0i 3.762 
(0.92) 
2.946 
(1.00) 
1.089 
(1.35) 
2.475 
(0.76) 
5.397 
(1.74) 
 18.631* 
(4.49) 
54.190* 
(4.98) 
2.540* 
(2.96) 
t 0.249 
(0.94) 
0.221 
(1.02) 
0.012 
(0.23) 
0.254 
(0.95) 
0.069 
(0.35) 
 -0.202 
(-0.65) 
-2.525* 
(-2.98) 
-0.061 
(-0.91) 
 *
t
    -0.253
* 
(-3.06) 
-0.163* 
(-2.51) 
-0.021 
(-1.30) 
0.006 
(0.07) 
-0.123* 
(-1.99) 
 -0.039 
(-0.41) 
0.594* 
(2.31) 
0.032 
(1.62) 
t  -0.100
* 
(-3.19) 
-0.081* 
(-3.02) 
0.0004 
(0.07) 
-0.048 
(-1.52) 
-0.024 
(-1.00) 
 -0.012 
(-0.30) 
0.037 
(0.32) 
0.004 
(0.42) 
rLt 0.050 
(0.32) 
0.016 
(0.12) 
0.089* 
(2.97) 
-0.087 
(-0.51) 
0.050 
(0.42) 
 0.317 
(1.83) 
1.205* 
(2.39) 
-0.149* 
(-3.77) 
dbt 0.015 
(0.71) 
0.011 
(0.59) 
-0.011* 
(-2.53) 
-0.015 
(-0.77) 
-0.005 
(-0.30) 
 0.129* 
(4.35) 
0.004 
(0.05) 
-0.009 
(-1.63) 
 *
t 1
    0.223
* 
(2.69) 
0.203* 
(3.11) 
0.003 
(0.20) 
0.242* 
(3.02) 
0.061 
(0.98) 
 -0.088 
(-0.90) 
0.495* 
(1.97) 
0.038 
(1.93) 
 
t 1
x

  -0.575
* 
(-5.72) 
-0.573* 
(-5.93) 
-0.851* 
(-9.60) 
-0.866* 
(-5.71) 
-0.457* 
(-6.40) 
 -0.989* 
(-9.41) 
-1.157* 
(-3.79) 
-1.800* 
(-10.47) 
 
t 1
x

   0.034 
(0.32) 
-0.016 
(-0.15) 
-0.010 
(-0.13) 
0.407* 
(3.00) 
-0.250* 
(-3.00) 
 0.237* 
(2.90) 
0.180 
(0.77) 
0.277 
(1.93) 
          
Number of instruments 68 68 68 68 68  68 68 68 
          
Serial Correlation: AR(1) -1.59 -1.55 -2.29* -1.61 -2.33  -2.01 -1.70 -2.06* 
Serial Correlation: AR(1) 0.41 -0.14 0.91 1.99 -1.33  0.91 0.04 -1.75 
          
Note: Estimates of (1) are derived using a system GMM linear dynamic panel data estimator. The number of instruments displayed refers to the number of lagged values of the regressors (in level and first difference form) that are 
used as instruments for the explanatory variables. The Arellano-Bond test is used to test for 1st and 2nd order serial correlation in the first difference errors. 1st order serial correlation does not imply model misspecification since the 
first difference of the errors will be serially correlated. Serial correlation at higher orders should be absent. The estimated equation also includes time dummies (the estimates from which are not reported to conserve space) that 
account for idiosyncratic time effects. T-ratios are shown in parentheses from robust standard errors. The computation of robust standard errors means the Sargan-Hansen test of over-identifying restrictions is not available, since the 
test assumes homoscedastic error terms. The equation includes country fixed effects and time dummies not reported to conserve space. * indicates significance at the 5% level. 
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Table 3: Voracity Equation 
 
          
 OLS estimates Weighted Least Squares estimates IV estimates 
          
 Total 
spending 
Current 
spending 
Government 
transfers 
Total 
spending 
Current 
spending 
Government 
transfers 
Total 
spending 
Current 
spending 
Government 
transfers 
          
Central government spending 
as a proportion of the total 
-0.033* 
(-2.12) 
-0.042* 
(-2.53) 
-0.041 
(-1.67) 
-0.035* 
(-2.55) 
-0.044* 
(-3.21) 
-0.045 
(-1.94) 
-0.044* 
(-2.09) 
-0.058* 
(-2.60) 
-0.034 
(-0.95) 
          
GDP per capita 0.000002* 
(5.21) 
0.000003* 
(5.94) 
0.0000009 
(0.90) 
0.000002* 
(3.15) 
0.000003* 
(3.49) 
0.000001 
(0.77) 
0.000002* 
(2.86) 
0.000003* 
(3.01) 
0.0000009 
(0.68) 
          
Output volatility -1.054* 
(-2.74) 
-0.864* 
(-2.38) 
-1.940* 
(-2.02) 
-0.993 
(-1.66) 
-0.843 
(-1.40) 
-2.021 
(-1.90) 
-1.060 
(-1.55) 
-0.872 
(-1.22) 
-1.937 
(-1.70) 
          
Openness 1.249 
(1.12) 
0.981 
(1.01) 
8.557* 
(5.23) 
1.099 
(0.95) 
0.929 
(0.79) 
8.929* 
(4.36) 
1.452 
(1.09) 
1.250 
(0.90) 
8.441* 
(3.81) 
          
Note: OLS estimates derived assuming an exogenous central government spending proportion. The Weighted Least Squares regression is estimated where the weighting is proportional to the government spending proportion and 
we make the adjustment proportional to the absolute value of the residual. The IV estimates instrument the proportion using GDP per capita, land area and population. * indicates significance at the 5% level. 
 
 
